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Abstract. The systems that statisticians are asked to assess, such as
nuclear weapons, infrastructure networks, supercomputer codes and
munitions, have become increasingly complex. It is often costly to con-
duct full system tests. As such, we present a review of methodology
that has been proposed for addressing system reliability with limited
full system testing. The first approaches presented in this paper are
concerned with the combination of multiple sources of information to
assess the reliability of a single component. The second general set of
methodology addresses the combination of multiple levels of data to
determine system reliability. We then present developments for com-
plex systems beyond traditional series/parallel representations through
the use of Bayesian networks and flowgraph models. We also include
methodological contributions to resource allocation considerations for
system relability assessment. We illustrate each method with applica-
tions primarily encountered at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Key words and phrases: Bayesian, Bayesian network, biased data,
complex system, count data, degradation data, fault tree, flowgraph, ge-
netic algorithm, lifetime data, logistic regression, Markov chain Monte
Carlo, Metropolis algorithm, multilevel data, nonhomogeneous Poisson
process, prior elicitation, reliability block diagram, repairable system,
resource allocation.
1. INTRODUCTION
By definition, reliability is the probability a sys-
tem will perform its intended function for at least
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a given period of time when operated under some
specified conditions. The systems that we are asked
to assess are becoming increasingly complex, includ-
ing, for example, nuclear weapons, infrastructure
networks, supercomputer codes and munitions. In
many instances it is not possible to mount vast num-
bers of full system tests, and frequently none is avail-
able (Bennentt, Booker, Keller-McNulty and Singpur-
walla, 2003). Systems reliability methodology is faced
with the challenge of developing models for these
complex systems and integrating multiple, sometimes
indirect, sources of information to perform estima-
tion, make inferences and answer questions about
the allocation of additional testing resources.
This paper focuses on four methodological issues
that arise from complex systems reliability prob-
lems. In Section 2, we address methods for integrat-
ing multiple data sources to assess the reliability of
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a single component. The data may come from many
sources, including experimental test results, com-
puter simulations and expert opinion. In Section 3,
we consider methods for assessing systems reliability
when the data are available at multiple levels (e.g.,
both system and component). Again, there may be
multiple sources of data at each component or at the
system itself. In Section 4, we discuss Bayesian net-
works and flowgraph models, which are richer rep-
resentations that are able to model more systems
than fault trees or reliability block diagrams can. In
Section 5 we consider the resource allocation prob-
lem for systems. Section 6 summarizes our view of
some of the current research challenges in systems
reliability assessment.
The analyses presented here follow hierarchical
Bayesian approaches and focus on estimating the
reliability R(t), in most cases as a function of time.
We will write R(t|Θ) to denote reliability given un-
known parameters Θ, and after obtaining a poste-
rior distribution pi(Θ|D) for Θ based on data D,
estimates of R(t) can be obtained from, for exam-
ple, the posterior mean
∫
R(t|Θ)pi(Θ|D)dΘ. In each
example we use these meanings for R,pi,Θ and D.
2. INTEGRATING MULTIPLE DATA SOURCES
TO ASSESS COMPONENT RELIABILITY
In this section, we consider the assessment of com-
ponent reliability when multiple data sources are
available. Ideally, we would like a large set of pass/fail
tests or failure time observations to estimate the re-
liability of a component. We are often in situations
where this is not the case, but we are able to sup-
plement our data with other information sources.
In this section, we consider specifically degradation
data, surrogate data and a biased sample of pass/fail
data.
2.1 Degradation and Failure Time Data
An important practical example is the case where
failure time data are augmented with degradation
data. Suppose that we are interested in the lifetime
distribution of a component. In the past we have
observed n1 failures at times Tj for j = 1, . . . , n1.
A further n2 components are still functioning and
their ages are Aj for j = n1 + 1, . . . , n1 + n2. Fi-
nally, n3 components were destructively tested and
these tests yielded the continuous measurements Yj
at ages tj for j = n1 + n2 + 1, . . . , n1 + n2 + n3. The
Yj tend to decrease with age and it is thought that
this decrease is closely related to the eventual failure
of the components.
We seek to analyze these data simultaneously us-
ing a hierarchical Bayesian approach by first assum-
ing that the degradation process satisfies
Yj ∼Normal(α− β
−1
j tj, σ
2
y).
This assumption implies that components are identi-
cal at birth, although measurement error is present
even when testing new units. Differences in com-
ponents arise later as each is allowed to degrade
at its own rate β−1j , and we assume that logβj ∼
Normal(µ,σ2b ). We estimate both µ and σb; µ has a
normal prior distribution and σb has a gamma prior
distribution. The measurement error standard devi-
ation σy is also given a gamma prior distribution. To
relate this degradation process to the failure times,
assume that a critical lower level L exists and that
Tj = inf{t≥ 0 :α− β
−1
j t≤ L}= (α−L)βj ,
so that logTj ∼Normal(µ+ log(α−L), σ
2
b ). In this
problem the reliability is defined to be the survivor
function of a generic lifetime T , P{T > t}. The level
L can be given a prior distribution and estimated;
in most cases the value of the degradation process
that is required for successful performance will be
approximately known, so that this prior distribu-
tion will be informative. We assume that L/α ∼
Beta(a, b). The lognormal distribution for Tj defines
the likelihood for both the censored lifetimes and
the observed lifetimes. This yields the unnormalized
posterior distribution
pi(Θ|D)
= pi(α,β,σb, µ, σy,L|T,A,y)
∝ φ
(
α−mα
sα
)
φ
(
µ− sµ
sµ
)
σ
aσy−1
y exp(−rσyσy)
· σ
aσb−1
b exp(−rσbσb)
· α−1
(
L
α
)a−1(α−L
α
)b−1
·
n1∏
j=1
((σbTj)
−1φ[{logTj − µ(1)
− log(α−L)}/σb])
·
n1+n2∏
j=n1+1
(1−Φ[σ−1b {logAj − µ
− log(α−L)}])
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·
n1+n2+n3∏
j=n1+n2+1
[(σbβj)
−1φ{(log βj − µ)/σb}σ
−1
y
· φ({yj −α− β
−1
j tj}/σy)],
where φ and Φ denote the standard normal density
and distribution functions, respectively, and where
mα, sα,mµ, sµ, sσy , rσy , sσb , rσb , a and b denote fixed
quantities that define prior distributions for α and
other parameters. Samples from this unnormalized
posterior distribution can be drawn using a variable-
at-a-time random walk Metropolis algorithm.
As an example, consider a simulated population
of items at time 20 years after fabrication. We have
observed four failures, all in the last two years, and
76 items have survived to this point. We also have
one degradation data point per year up to year 20.
The data were simulated under α= 100, L= 20 and
µ = log(0.35) = −1.05; this implies that the degra-
dation curve will cross level L at age 0.35(100 −
20) = 28 years. Other parameters of the simulation
include σb = 0.2 and σy = 5. In our prior distri-
butions, we used α ∼ Gamma(4,1/30) (with mean
120), σy ∼Gamma(4,1/2.5), σb ∼Gamma(4,5), µ∼
Normal(0,1), and L/α∼Uniform(0,1). The results
are shown in Figure 1. The solid curve is the true re-
liability (survivor function) R(t), the dashed curve
is
∫
Φ(µ+log(α−L)−log tσb )pi(Θ|D), the posterior mean
of the survivor function, and the dotted curves are
the 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distri-
bution. There is substantial uncertainty in the re-
liability just a few years into the future, but this
is considerably better than could be obtained using
the (mostly censored) failure times alone. Posterior
estimates (and 90% posterior probability intervals)
for the parameters are 99.2 (92.9, 105.1) for α, 17.6
(2.3, 34.6) for L, −1.00 (−1.21, −0.76) for µ, 6.57
(3.8, 10.3) for σy and 0.24 (0.14, 0.35) for σb. This
approach has the advantage that the threshold pa-
rameter L does not need to be known with certainty
and can be estimated; doing so can provide a diag-
nostic for the value historically assumed for L. The
approach can also benefit from strong prior infor-
mation about L, which might come from physical
or engineering knowledge used to define the require-
ments for the component.
2.2 Bernoulli and Quality Assurance Data
Anderson-Cook et al. (2005) applied ideas from
medical statistics to combine pass/fail data with
component quality assurance data to get more pre-
cise reliability estimates. Anderson-Cook et al. (2005)
actually worked in a system context but here we dis-
cuss the single component variant of the problem;
see Section 3.2 for the system extension. A compo-
nent undergoes destructive pass/fail testing at var-
ious ages. Suppose that age is the only covariate
of interest, although the model is general enough
to allow multiple covariates. Further suppose that
the component can also be tested destructively for
adherence to up to J published specifications. We
assume that each such test related to the jth speci-
fication (j = 1, . . . , J) yields (possibly after transfor-
mation) a normally distributed measurement with
mean αj + δjt and variance γ
2
j if the test is con-
ducted at age t. It is thought that these specifica-
tion measurements are related to the component’s
performance in a pass/fail test, and we assume that
the measurements have been transformed so that
large values of the measurement are thought to be
good. We now invoke an assumption to relate the
two types of data. This assumption is inspired by
the concept of surrogate variables in medical studies
(Prentice, 1989; Pepe, 1992). Suppose that it were
possible to obtain a system test Y on the same unit
where we obtained a full set of specification mea-
surements Z1, . . . ,ZJ . Then we assume
Pr{Y = 1|Z, t}=
J∏
j=1
Φ
(
Zj − θj
σj
)
,
independently of t. In this model, each of the J
quantities represented in specifications is indepen-
dently capable of causing failure, and it is not possi-
ble, for example, for two quantities with somewhat
low values to collaboratively cause failure. If the lat-
ter behavior is desired, it is possible to replace the
product with a multivariate normal integral. Here θj
and σj are unknown, given prior distributions, and
estimated. Their prior distributions can be informa-
tive if the published specifications are thought to be
highly relevant to reliability. The key result, since
it is impossible to observe the Zj for a component
that undergoes pass/fail testing, is that the Zj can
be integrated out, so that
R(t|Θ) = Pr{Y = 1|t,Θ}
(2)
=
J∏
j=1
Φ
(
αj + δjt− θj√
γ2j + σ
2
j
)
.
Terms like this can be multiplied by normal density
terms that reflect the specification measurements
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so as to combine the two sources of data. Assum-
ing that the data consist of system tests Y1, . . . , Ym
taken at ages t1, . . . , tm and specification measure-
ments Z1, . . . ,Zn taken at ages τ1, . . . , τn, where mea-
surement Zi corresponds to the kith specification,
the likelihood function is
L(α, δ, γ, σ, θ|Y,Z)
=
m∏
i=1
R(ti|Θ)
Yi{1−R(ti|Θ)}
1−Yi
·
n∏
j=1
σ−1kj φ
(
Zj −αkj − δkjτj
σkj
)
.
2.3 Biased and Unbiased Samples
Graves et al. (2006) discussed a challenging prob-
lem whose solution could be applied in a reliability
context because it involves the estimation of preva-
lence of a feature in a stratified population. A pop-
ulation of items was manufactured in lots, and it
was of interest to estimate the fraction of items in
each lot with a certain feature. There was reason
to believe that feature prevalence had a nonzero,
but imperfect, relationship with lot membership, so
the authors assumed that if the jth lot was of size
Nj , the number of features Kj in the lot had a
Binomial(Nj , pj) distribution, where the pj had a
hierarchical prior pj ∼Beta(a, b), with a and b given
prior distributions. Some of the lots were inspected
using random (hypergeometric) sampling: a sample
of size nrj was taken from the jth lot for inspec-
tion and yrj features were found. These data alone
can be analyzed using a Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm to obtain samples from the joint
distribution of (a, b,p,K). However, some other fea-
ture data were available from items selected using
nonrandom sampling (a “convenience sample”); the
selection process may or may not have been inde-
pendent of feature presence. To combine these two
sources of data, one needs to model this nonran-
dom sampling, and Graves et al. (2006) used the
extended hypergeometric distribution. In fact, the
convenience samples were taken before the random
samples. Denote by ncj and y
c
j the sample size and
number of features found from the jth lot in the con-
venience sample. Then the extended hypergeometric
model is
P (yci = y)
=
(
nci
y
)(
Ni − n
c
i
Ki − y
)
θy
∑min(nc
i
,Ki)
j=max(0,nc
i
−Ni+Ki)
(
nci
j
)(
Ni − n
c
i
Ki − j
)
θj
.
Fig. 1. Reliability estimates with uncertainty bands for the degradation and failure time data integration example. The solid
curve is the true reliability function, the dashed curve is the posterior mean and the dotted curves are the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distribution.
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When the unknown biasing parameter θ = 1, this is
the hypergeometric model; for θ > 1, items with the
feature are more likely to be sampled, and so forth.
Graves et al. (2006) assumed that the amount of
biasing is constant in each lot (θ does not depend
on the lot), put a lognormal prior distribution on θ
and estimated the amount of biasing. Their data set
turned out to be inconclusive about the direction of
the bias. The likelihood for the randomly sampled
data is
yri ∼Hypergeometric(K
r
i ,N
r
i −K
r
i , n
r
i ),
which is to say
P (yri = y) =
(
nri
y
)(
N ri − n
r
i
Kri − y
)
(
N ri
Kri
) ,
where N ri = Ni − n
c
i and K
r
i = Ki − y
c
i . Graves et
al. (2006) sampled from the resulting posterior dis-
tribution of (p,K, a, b, θ) using YADAS. Integrating
the convenience samples with the randomly sampled
data enabled a more precise estimate of the quantity
of interest—the prevalence of features among the
unsampled items, f(K) =
∑
i(Ki−y
c
i−y
r
i )/
∑
i(Ni−
nci−n
r
i )—without making unwarranted assumptions
such as the prevalence of features being the same in
each lot or the convenience sampling being done in-
dependently of feature presence. In a simplified case
where items that lack the feature have reliability 1
and items with the feature have reliability 0, the pos-
terior mean reliability is the integral of f(K) with
respect to the posterior distribution of K.
Further study is required before one can recom-
mend using a more informative prior for the amount
of bias θ. It is difficult to relate the parameter to
knowledge about the sampling process in a quanti-
tatively precise manner. If the biasing mechanism
is better understood, that mechanism should be ex-
plicitly included in the model rather than the ap-
proach given here.
3. ASSESSING SYSTEM RELIABILITY WITH
MULTILEVEL DATA
In Section 2, we discussed combining multiple data
sources to assess a single component. In this sec-
tion, we consider combining multiple sources of data
in a system reliability assessment. In particular, we
consider situations where we have data about both
components and combinations of components—for
example, about the entire system. Hamada et al.
(2004) developed models for the case of a fault tree
with binary data at basic, intermediate and top events.
Here we give examples of combining failure time
data, failure count data, Bernoulli data and degra-
dation data.
3.1 Logistic Regression, Weibull Lifetimes and
Degradation
As an example of integrating multilevel reliability
data, we work with a variant of an analysis discussed
in Graves and Hamada (2005). The system con-
sists of three components combined in series, and all
three components may see degrading performance
with age. For component 1, we have binary test data
at various ages and we assume a logistic regression
relationship for the success probability as a function
of age. If X1 denotes a generic component 1 of age t
(centered) and X1 = 1 denotes component success,
logit Pr{X1 = 1}= θ0 + θ1t.
We assume independent normal priors for θ0 and θ1,
and in our simulated data, we have 25 tests each at
ages 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 15 and 20, with one failure at
age 4, two at age 15 and six at age 20.
Component 2 is assumed to have a Weibull life-
time distribution with
Pr{T2 > t}= exp(−λ0t
λ1),
where T2 denotes a generic lifetime for component
2. Component 2 is said to work properly in a test if
its life has not yet ended at the time it is tested. We
observe eight uncensored lifetimes ranging from 14.1
years to 33.5 years, with 13 lifetimes right-censored
at 20 years and four right-censored at 40 years.
Our data for component 3 mirrors the analysis
in Section 2.1: we have ten total pieces of degra-
dation data taken every two years [these data are
normal with mean α+ β−1j tj and variance σ
2
y , with
logβj ∼Normal(µ,σ
2
b )] and 80 lifetimes, all but two
of them censored at 20 years. [The logs of these data
are normal with mean µ+ log(α−D) and variance
σ2b .] This time, we assume that D = 20 is known
with certainty. Finally, we also have binomial sys-
tem test data (15 tests each at ages 0, 5, 10, 15 and
20, with one failure at age zero and three at age
20). Since this is a series system, the probability of
system success for a system of age t is then
R(t|Θ) = logit−1(θ0 + θ1t) · exp(−λ0t
λ1)
· {1−Φ({log t− µ− log(α−D)}/σb)}.
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The component data sets can be analyzed together
with the system data by multiplying all the likeli-
hood functions with the prior distributions for all
the unknown parameters. Again, samples from the
posterior distribution can be drawn using a variable-
at-a-time random walk Metropolis algorithm, and
setting up the problem is straightforward in YADAS
(Graves, 2003). YADAS can handle much larger sys-
tems (e.g., Johnson, Graves, Hamada and Reese,
2003), for the case of pass/fail data with no aging
at all levels). The user can specify the system struc-
ture in a file and component data can take many
forms, assuming only that the user can express the
success probability at each component as a function
of unknown parameters. Figure 2 displays the re-
sults of the analysis. For each component and for
the full system, we display the mean and 5th and
95th percentiles of the posterior distribution of reli-
ability as a function of age. Component 2 dominates
the unreliability at early ages, while the other two
components are bigger concerns at later ages.
3.2 Combining Partially Informative System
Tests with Component Tests
Anderson-Cook et al. (2005) analyzed data from
a system in which the system pass/fail testing data
provide incomplete information about which compo-
nent(s) was responsible for a failure. In particular,
for the ith test, the data consist of a set C1(i) of
components known to have worked, a second set of
components C2(i) known to have failed, and a third
set of components C3(i), where it is known that at
least one component in that set failed. Anderson-
Cook et al. (2005) did this in the context of combin-
ing these system tests with component specification
testing data (see Section 2.2). In a multiple com-
ponent context, denote by pik the probability in (2)
that component k works properly in test i. Then the
probability of observing data (C1(i),C2(i),C3(i)) given
these component success probabilities is{ ∏
k∈C1(i)
pik
}{ ∏
k∈C2(i)
(1− pik)
}{
1−
∏
k∈C3(i)
pik
}
,
where the third product is understood to equal 0 if
it is empty (the other products are 1 if empty). Re-
sults obtained by Anderson-Cook et al. (2005) for a
two-component series system are shown in Figure 3.
Denoting by Ri(t|Θ) the reliability of component i
given in expression (2), the posterior mean system
reliability is
∫
R1(t|Θ)R2(t|Θ)pi(Θ|D)dΘ. Since the
Fig. 2. Reliability estimates and uncertainty intervals for the three-component system. Upper left: Component 1, which
has logistic regression data. Upper right: Component 2, with Weibull failure time data. Lower left: Component 3, with both
degradation data and lognormal failure time data. Lower right: The full series system with all four data sets.
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data are proprietary, both axes (time and reliabil-
ity) have been rescaled to [0,1]. The black curves
show the integration of the two types of data (poste-
rior means, 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior
distribution). The solid and dashed curves show the
previous methodology used by the system engineers:
logistic regression using full system data only. The
component test data are in this case available for
older components, which greatly tightens the uncer-
tainty bounds for older systems (dotted lines). (This
analysis depicts a small subsystem of the full system,
and none of the components in the small subsystem
appears to age significantly.)
This is a form of “autopsy data.” Meilijson (1994)
used the expectation-maximization algorithm to ob-
tain maximum likelihood estimates for failure time
distribution parameters from the failure time of the
system and the set of components that failed by
that time. G˚asemyr and Natvig (2001) worked with
lifetime data, where the set of failed components
is identified when the system fails and some com-
ponents are monitored either at all times or from
certain time points onward (if a component fails
while being monitored, its failure time is observed
exactly). They also observed systems that did not
fail before a censoring time. They derived expres-
sions for the likelihood function under general sys-
tem structures, including the case of dependent fail-
ures, and identified conjugate prior distributions in
the case that failure times follow generalized gamma
distributions.
3.3 Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process
Highly clustered modern supercomputers are ex-
amples of systems composed of many similar sys-
tems in series. Ryan and Reese (2005) presented a
model for the reliability of a Los Alamos National
Laboratory supercomputer that consists of 48 highly
similar computers. While they are often referred to
as massively parallel, a job that begins on n = 48
components in a cluster will finish only if all n com-
ponents function correctly for the duration of the
computational task. Essentially, these 48 computers
behave as 48 repairable systems in series. Figure 4
plots the cumulative number of failures versus time
for each of the 48 computers. There is one “outlying”
computer with considerably more failures. In partic-
ular, computer 21 is different in both structure and
usage.
Whereas this is a repairable system, we seek to
establish a stochastic point process, N(a, b), for the
number of failures in an interval (a, b]. We further
define N(t) as the number of failures in (0, t]. An
important class of models for failure times of a re-
pairable system is that of the nonhomogeneous Pois-
son processes (NHPP). An NHPP is defined by its
nonnegative intensity ν(t). Under a NHPP:
• The process N(a, b) is a Poisson random variable
with mean µ(a, b) =
∫ b
a ν(t)dt.
• The processes N(a1, b1) and N(a2, b2) are inde-
pendent if (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) are disjoint (i.e.,
either b1 < a2 or b2 < a1).
Power law process (PLP) and loglinear process
models are common choices for the intensity func-
tion ν(t). Ryan and Reese (2005) introduced an ex-
tended model that includes a positive parameter ρ to
model appropriate asymptotic behavior. They con-
sidered intensities of the form
ν(t) =
φ
η
(
t
η
)φ−1
+ ρ.
When φ < 1, the system undergoes reliability growth
and has a limiting failure rate of ρ. (The intensity
never increases or levels off to a constant value, re-
gardless of the choice of φ.)
We present a hierarchical Bayesian model for the
Poisson process that governs these data. Assume
that the number of failures experienced by computer
i in month j, X = [xij ] (a C×M matrix), has prob-
ability mass function
p(X|η,φ, ρ)
=
C∏
i=1
[
M∏
j=1
[{(
tj
ηi
)φi
−
(
t(j − 1)
ηi
)φi
+ tρi
}xij/
xij!
]
· exp
{
−
((
Mt
ηi
)φi
+Mtρi
)}]
.
Next, allow for a gamma prior distribution on η that
is parameterized in terms of the mean µη and stan-
dard deviation ση . That is, use
p(η|µη, ση) =
(
(µη/σ
2
η)
(µη/ση)
2
Γ((µη/ση)2)
)C
·
C∏
i=1
[
η
(µη/ση)2−1
i exp
(
−
µη
σ2η
ηi
)]
.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of two reliability estimation procedures. Left: Logistic regression on full system data alone. Right: Inte-
gration of component specification tests and partially informative system tests. Shown are posterior medians and 5th and 95th
percentiles of posterior distributions.
Fig. 4. Empirical cumulative failure counts of 48 components.
Similarly, let
p(φ|µφ, σφ) =
(
(µφ/σ
2
φ)
(µφ/σφ)
2
Γ((µφ/σφ)2)
)C
·
C∏
i=1
[
φi
(µφ/σφ)
2
−1 exp
(
−
µφ
σ2φ
φi
)]
and
p(ρ|µρ, σρ) =
(
(µρ/σ
2
ρ)
(µρ/σρ)2
Γ((µρ/σρ)2)
)C
·
C∏
i=1
[
ρi
(µρ/σρ)2−1 exp
(
−
µρ
σ2ρ
ρi
)]
.
This hierarchical specification assumes a priori con-
ditional independence of the computer-specific pa-
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Fig. 5. Posterior distributions of six-hour reliability versus start time. Shown are the posterior median and 0.05 and 0.95
posterior quantiles.
rameters. This assumption is not as restrictive as
that of complete independence. In fact, a posteriori,
the parameters will reflect dependence as manifest
by the data. As such, we are willing to make this
assumption.
The distribution of (η,φ, ρ|µη, ση, µφ, σφ, µρ, σρ) has
density
p(η,φ, ρ|µη, ση, µφ, σφ, µρ, σρ)
= p(η|µη, ση)p(φ|µφ, σφ)p(ρ|µρ, σρ).
Finally, let
µη ∼Weibull(aµη , bµη),
ση ∼Weibull(aση , bση),
µφ ∼Weibull(aµφ , bµφ),
σφ ∼Weibull(aσφ , bσφ),
µρ ∼Weibull(aµρ , bµρ),
σρ ∼Weibull(aσρ , bσρ).
For the ith computer, Ni(a, b) is a Poisson random
variable with mean µi(a, b). Thus, the probability
that the ith computer has no failures in (a, b) is
P (Ni(a, b) = 0|φi, ηi, ρi)
= 1− exp
((
a
ηi
)φi
+ ρia−
(
b
ηi
)φi
− ρib
)
.
We use an operational definition of reliability to
mean a job of length l run on a computer of age
s finishes without computer failure. Since the super-
computer is a series system in its 48 components,
reliability R(l, s|Θ) is
R(l, s|Θ) =
48∏
i=1
[
exp
((
s
ηi
)φi
−
(
s+ l
ηi
)φi
− ρil
)]
.
Figure 5 summarizes the posterior distribution of
reliability R(6, s|Θ) versus start time s for six-hour
computer runs. The three lines included on this plot
are the 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles and the median of
R(6, s|Θ) with respect to pi(Θ|D). As s increases,
these three lines increase, indicating reliability growth.
While this is a simple system example, it illus-
trates the power of Bayesian hierarchical models for
integrating multiple, similar sources of information
to assess overall system reliability. The next example
considers a simple system composed of very differ-
ent components and the combination of system and
component testing.
3.4 Lifetime Data
As a demonstration of the multiple levels of data
collected on a simple system, consider a system that
consists of only three components that are all re-
quired to work so that the system as a whole works.
An event tree representation of such a system is
pictured in Figure 6. While this is a simple sys-
tem, important data combination methods can be
illustrated. There are four reliability functions of in-
terest: one for each of the three components and
one additional reliability function, which is the sys-
tem reliability function. Furthermore, suppose that
at each component we conduct ni = 20, i = 2,3,4,
tests and record the time until failure. We also col-
lect nS = 10 full system tests independent of the
component data and observe the time until failure.
Given this system structure and the test data, we
can explore the features of the proposed Bayesian
system reliability modeling.
Goodness-of-fit techniques revealed that a reason-
able model for the distribution of failure times of the
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Fig. 6. Reliability event tree for system reliability.
components is Weibull, that is,
fi(t|Θ) =
αi
βi
(
t
βi
)αi
exp
[
−
(
t
βi
)αi]
, i= 2,3,4.
Note that this parameterization of the Weibull dis-
tribution is different than that in Section 3.1, with
λ0 = (1/βi)
α
i and λ1 = αi. Here the component relia-
bilities Ri(t|Θ) (i= 2,3,4) are given by
∫
∞
t f(t|Θ)dt,
so that the system reliability at time t is RS(t|Θ) =
R2(t|Θ)R3(t|Θ)R4(t|Θ). Our prior specification is
that αi and βi are all exchangeable (i.e., indepen-
dent given their prior parameters) and are from a
common gamma distribution, that is,
p(αi|λa, ζa)∝ α
λa−1
i exp(−ζaαi),
p(βi|λb, ζb)∝ α
λb−1
i exp(−ζbαi).
Then, to complete the hierarchical specification, we
propose that λa, ζa, λb and ζb have exponential dis-
tributions, each with their own rate parameters.
Given the specification above, we use a successive
substitution MCMC procedure where each compo-
nent of the joint posterior distribution is updated
one at a time. The posterior distributions (as a func-
tion of time) for the reliability function of each of
the components in the example system are presented
in Figure 7. They are organized as upper left, the
posterior distribution of the full system C1; upper
Fig. 7. Posterior distributions (as a function of time) for the reliability function of each of the components in the system.
The upper left panel is the posterior distribution of the full system C1; the upper right panel is the posterior distribution for the
component C2; the lower left panel is the posterior distribution for component C3; and the lower right panel is the posterior
distribution for component C4.
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right, the posterior distribution for component C2;
lower left, the posterior distribution for component
C3; lower right, the posterior distribution for com-
ponent C4.
We note, in particular, that the posterior distri-
bution on the system reliability function is less vari-
able than that of any of the components. We only
used ten system tests and 20 component level tests,
suggesting that the component testing has improved
our state of knowledge about the system. Further,
we note that the improvement does not reflect an
improvement of the magnitude expected if we add
60 (or even 20) full system tests. This would result in
a posterior distribution with much less uncertainty.
Therefore, the component testing does not inform
the posterior proportionately to a full system test,
but it does improve our knowledge and can be par-
ticularly helpful when full system tests are sparse.
3.5 Elicitation for Reliability
The issues around elicitation for reliability fall
into three categories: elicitation methodology and
techniques, elicitation for parameters and prior spec-
ification in reliability models, and elicitation of sys-
tem structure and dependencies. The first two are
relatively well studied; the last is an open research
area.
Kadane and Wolfson (1998) stated that “the goal
of elicitation, as we see it, is to make it as easy as
possible for subject-matter experts to tell us what
they believe, in probabilistic terms, while reducing
how much they need to know about probability the-
ory to do so.” There is emerging consensus that the
following assertions represent good technique for pa-
rameters and prior elicitation (Kadane and Wolfson,
1998, page 4):
1. Experts should be asked to assess only observ-
able quantities, conditioning only on covariates
(which are also observable) or other observable
quantities.
2. Experts should not be asked to estimate moments
of a distribution (except possibly the first mo-
ment); they should be asked to assess quantiles
or probabilities of the predictive distribution.
3. Frequent feedback should be given to the expert
during the elicitation process. The feedback can
be graphical or verbal, and it should help the
expert develop coherent probabilities and under-
stand the implications of previous choices.
4. Experts should be asked to give assessments both
unconditionally and conditionally on hypotheti-
cal observed data.
The psychological underpinnings of these recom-
mendations are summarized in Meyer and Booker
(2001). Specific statistical techniques for deriving
predictive distributions that are useful in reliabil-
ity and calculating parameter and hyperparameter
distributions from elicited quantities can be found
in Kadane and Wolfson (1998), Percy (2002) and
Gutie´rrez-Pulido, Aguirre-Torres and Christen (2005).
More detailed elicitation case studies appear in Keeney
and von Winterfeldt (1991) and O’Hagan (1998).
Elicitation of priors for component parameters for
systems reliability is especially difficult because, given
a fault tree or reliability block diagram structure,
the prior distributions for parameters at the com-
ponents induce prior distributions on the system.
For example, suppose that we have a series system
with component reliability pi and that we assume a
Uniform(0,1) prior for each pi. This does not imply
that there is a uniform prior on the system itself.
Given a series system with k components, the prior
distribution on the system is [Γ(k)]−1(− log p)k−1,
which has mean 2−k (Parker, 1972). If the system
reliability has a Uniform(0,1) distribution and we
assume that each of the k components has the same
prior distribution, then this prior distribution is
[Γ(1/k)]−1(− log p)−(k−1)/k, which has mean 2−1/k .
The elicitation of system structure and depen-
dencies among components and failure modes is an
emerging area of research. Neil, Fenton and Nielson
(2000), Lee (2001) and Wilson, McNamara and Wil-
son (2007) discussed the construction of Bayesian
network representations (Section 4) for complex sys-
tems. Seshasai and Gupta (2004) discussed the mod-
eling of structure and information within engineer-
ing design process. Klamann and Koehler (2005)
proposed qualitative methods for the determination
of system structure. The issues are the determina-
tion of the correct granularity for representing com-
ponents and functionality, and the appropriate de-
pendencies among the components, functions and
failure modes. Qualitative models of systems that
capture these features underlie the development of
quantitative statistical models for systems reliabil-
ity.
4. REPRESENTING SYSTEMS
Fault trees and reliability block diagrams are the
most common representations in system reliability
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Fig. 8. Specifying joint probability distributions using a
Bayesian network.
analysis. However, there are situations where these
models do not offer enough flexibility to capture fea-
tures of the system. Bayesian networks generalize
fault trees and reliability block diagrams by allowing
components and subsystems to be related by con-
ditional probabilities instead of deterministic AND
and OR relationships. Flowgraph models are multi-
state models that simplify the analysis of time-to-
event data.
4.1 Bayesian Networks
There is growing literature on the use of Bayesian
networks (BNs) in reliability (e.g., Portinale, Bobbio
and Montani, 2005; Sigurdsson, Walls and Quigley,
2001; Lee, 2001), although there is quite a broad
literature on using BNs for probabilistic modeling
(e.g., Spiegelhalter, 1998; Neil, Fenton and Nielson,
2000; Laskey and Mahoney, 2000; Jensen, 2001).
Formally, a BN is a pair N = 〈(V,E), P 〉, where
(V,E) are the nodes and edges of a directed acyclic
graph and P is a probability distribution on V .
Each node contains a random variable, and the di-
rected edges between them define conditional depen-
dences/independences among the random variables.
Figure 8 summarizes the three probabilistic relation-
ships that can be specified in a BN. The key feature
of a BN is that it specifies the joint distribution P
over the set of nodes V in terms of conditional dis-
tributions. In particular, the joint distribution of V
is given by ∏
v∈V
P(v|parents[v]),
where the parents of a node are the set of nodes with
an edge pointing to the node. For example, in the
serial structure in Figure 8(a), the parent of node C
is node B, and node A has no parents.
Bayesian networks can be used as a direct gener-
alization of fault trees. The fault tree translation to
a BN is straightforward, with the basic events that
contribute to an intermediate event represented as
parents and a child. Figure 9 shows the correspon-
dence between a fault tree AND gate and a BN con-
verging structure. Notice that a fault tree implies
specific conditional probabilities. The same BN con-
verging structure works for an OR gate, with the
appropriate conditional probabilities.
Suppose that we have the BN from Figure 10 and
suppose that we are interested in calculating the
posterior probability for each component and the
full system. Hamada et al. (2004) discussed how to
approach this problem for the special case of fault
trees.
Fig. 9. Fault tree conversion to a Bayesian network.
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Fig. 10. Bayesian network generalization of the system ex-
ample.
Suppose that we have the same data as given in
Section 3.1. However, instead of a series system, we
have the relationships
P(S = 1|C1 = 1,C2 = 1,C3 = 1) = 0.9,
P(S = 1|C1 = 0,C2 = 1,C3 = 1) = 0.4,
P(S = 1|C1 = 1,C2 = 0,C3 = 1) = 0.3,
P(S = 1|C1 = 1,C2 = 1,C3 = 0) = 0.5,
P(S = 1|C1 = 0,C2 = 0,C3 = 1) = 0.1,
P(S = 1|C1 = 1,C2 = 0,C3 = 0) = 0.05,
P(S = 1|C1 = 0,C2 = 1,C3 = 0) = 0.25,
P(S = 1|C1 = 0,C2 = 0,C3 = 0) = 0.
Again, drawing from Section 3.1, let p1(t) =
logit−1(θ0 + θ1t), p2(t) = exp(−λ0t
λ1) and p3(t) =
{1−Φ({log t−µ− log(α−D)}/σb)}. Then the sys-
tem data can be modeled as Binomial(pS(t)), where
pS(t) = 0.9p1(t)p2(t)p3(t)
+ 0.4(1− p1(t))p2(t)p3(t)
+ 0.3p1(t)(1− p2(t))p3(t)
+ 0.5p1(t)p2(t)(1− p3(t))
+ 0.1(1− p1(t))(1− p2(t))p3(t)
+ 0.05p1(t)(1− p2(t))(1− p3(t))
+ 0.25(1− p1(t))p2(t)(1− p3(t)).
Here we omit the dependence on Θ for space rea-
sons. Figure 11 shows the posterior distribution for
system reliability: the posterior mean is solid and
the 5th and 95th percentiles are dotted.
The example given above can easily be general-
ized to the situation where the conditional proba-
bilities are not known, but are described by a distri-
bution. Neil, Fenton and Nielson (2000) and Wil-
son, McNamara and Wilson (2007) discussed the
construction of system models for BNs in detail.
For additional examples, see Farrow, Goldstein and
Fig. 11. Reliability estimates with uncertainty bands for the Bayesian network example. The solid curve is the posterior
mean and the dotted curves are the 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution.
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Fig. 12. Flowgraph model for a series pump system.
Spiropoulos (1997), Bedford and Cooke (2001) and
Portinale, Bobbio and Montani (2005).
4.2 Flowgraph Models
Flowgraph models offer another representation that
can be useful in solving reliability problems. A flow-
graph model is one type of multistate model. It is
useful for capturing potential outcomes probabilities
of outcomes, and waiting times for outcomes to oc-
cur, and is often used to model time-to-event data.
Like a graphical model, a flowgraph consists of nodes
and arcs. However, in a flowgraph model, the nodes
(or states) represent outcomes. This differs from a
BN, where the nodes represent random variables.
Consider Figure 12 from Huzurbazar (2005). This
flowgraph models the states of a pump system with
two pumps. The pumps operate independently and
the system can operate with one pump if necessary.
The nodes of the system represent states of the sys-
tem: state 0 represents no failed pumps, state 1 rep-
resents one failed pump and state 2 represents two
failed pumps. One quantity of interest is the time
to total failure, or the total time to transition from
state 0 to state 1 to state 2.
The directed line segments in a flowgraph are bran-
ches. Each branch has a transition probability and
waiting time distribution associated with a transi-
tion from its beginning to ending nodes. The branches
are labeled with transmittances, each of which is
the transition probability multiplied by the moment
generating function of the waiting time distribution.
For example, in Figure 12, the transition probability
from state 0 to state 1 is 1.0 and the moment gen-
erating function of the waiting time distribution is
M01(s). In Figure 13, the transition probability from
state 1 to state 0 is p10 and from state 1 to state 2
is p12, where p10 + p12 = 1. In this example, there
is no probability of staying in state 1—eventually a
transition always occurs.
Suppose that in Figure 12 the pumps fail indepen-
dently with an exponential distribution with mean
1/λ0, Exponential(λ0). The transition from state 0
to state 1 happens when either of the pumps fails,
which means that its waiting time is the minimum
of two independent exponential distributions, which
has an Exponential(2λ0) distribution.
Once in state 1, we assume that the remaining
pump has a failure time with an Exponential(λ1)
distribution, with λ1 >λ0. We assume that λ1 > λ0
to account for the extra stress on the pump once the
first has failed. The waiting time to transition from
state 0 to state 1 to state 2 is the sum of independent
exponential distributions. Since the waiting times
are independent, the moment generating function
of the sum of the waiting times is the product of the
individual times. The moment generating function
for an Exponential(λ) is M(s) = λ/(λ−s) for s < λ.
The moment generating function for the transition
from state 0 to state 2 is
M02(s) =M01(s)M12(s)
Fig. 13. Flowgraph model for a series pump system with feedback.
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=
2λ0
2λ0 − s
λ1
λ1 − s
.
This moment generating function uniquely deter-
mines the distribution of the waiting time. Since
we can now write an equivalent flowgraph with the
transmittance from state 0 to state 2, we have solved
the flowgraph from 0 to 2. Huzurbazar (2005) gave
a general algorithm based on Mason’s rule to solve
flowgraphs like those in Figures 12 and 13. The mo-
ment generating functions in the transmittances can
be converted to probability density functions (or
other summaries, like reliability or hazard functions)
either analytically or using saddlepoint approxima-
tion techniques. Huzurbazar (2000, 2005) gave a num-
ber of examples of flowgraph models, solving flow-
graphs and inverting flowgraph moment generating
functions.
5. RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Sections 2 and 3 considered the analysis of vari-
ous sources of component data and a mix of com-
ponent and system data, respectively, to assess sys-
tem reliability. In this section, we address how to
allocate limited testing resources; we simply refer to
this problem as resource allocation (Hamada et al.,
2004). That is, given a limited budget, where should
additional tests be done (at the system level and/or
the component level) and how many tests should be
done there?
First, we assume that there is a cost for collecting
additional data and that it is more costly to collect
higher level (e.g., system) data than lower level (e.g.,
component) data. For specified costs, a candidate
allocation, that is, the number of tests at the system
level and at all the components, must not exceed a
fixed budget.
Next, we need a criterion with which to evaluate
a candidate allocation and to compare two differ-
ent candidate allocations. We use one based on re-
peated pre-posterior analyses. The fact that we can
analyze the varied data presented in Sections 2 and
3 allows us to take such an approach. The criterion
can be described operationally as follows. We draw
from the parameter prior distribution (based on the
existing data), simulate data according to the can-
didate allocation using the current prior draw as the
true parameters and then update with the simulated
data to obtain the parameter posterior distribution.
Using this parameter posterior distribution, we eval-
uate the system reliability posterior distribution and
Fig. 14. Event tree for a two-component series system.
record some distributional characteristic. For exam-
ple, we often use the length of the central 90% cred-
ible interval as a measure of uncertainty that we
would like to reduce. Repeating this procedure pro-
duces an empirical distribution of posterior credible
interval lengths. As a criterion for the candidate al-
location, we use an upper quantile, for example, the
0.90 quantile.
Finally, we need to find the candidate allocation
that optimizes, in this case minimizes, the criterion.
To do the optimization problem, we can use a ge-
netic algorithm (GA) (Goldberg, 1989). We have im-
plemented a GA for resource allocation in R (R De-
velopment Core Team, 2004), which generates the
candidate allocations. A candidate allocation is also
evaluated in R by repeatedly generating data sets
and calling YADAS (Graves, 2003, 2007) to do the
Bayesian updating. YADAS produces an output file
of parameter posterior draws that is read into R to
calculate the candidate allocation criterion.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the
case where there are only binomial count data at the
system and component levels. We illustrate resource
allocation for a simple series system that consists
of two components as displayed in Figure 14 as an
event tree.
Johnson, Graves, Hamada and Reese (2003) showed
how to combine system and component level bino-
mial data in a reliability assessment. For example,
if the series system structure in Figure 14 is valid
and the components are independent, then the sys-
tem reliability p1 equals p2p3, the product of the two
component reliabilities. Consequently, system level
data are informative about the component reliabili-
ties through this relationship.
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Let TCi be the corresponding costs: TC1 is the
cost of a system test, and TC2 and TC3 are the
component costs. Let ni be the corresponding num-
ber of tests so that for budget B,
∑3
i=1 TCini ≤B.
Under this scenario where the system structure
(i.e., series) holds and binomial count data are col-
lected, resource allocation depends on these costs.
If TC1 ≥ TC2 + TC3, then the optimal allocation
will consist only of component tests. Even if TC1 =
TC2 + TC3, there is still more information gained
from individual component tests than one system
test. That is, doing one system test as compared
with testing each component once provides less in-
formation. If TC1 = TC2 = TC3, then the optimal
allocation is all system tests. If TC1 < TC2 + TC3,
there must be a mixture of system and component
tests, but trying to characterize this mixture re-
mains to be done.
An important reason for performing system tests
is that they are integrative, which in the above dis-
cussion was not accounted for. That is, does the sys-
tem work when all the components are assembled?
Consequently, system tests are needed to assess the
assumed structure. The previously stated relation-
ship between the system and component reliabilities
for the simple series system,
p1 = p2p3,
assumes that the series structure with independence
holds. To allow for the possibility that the assumed
structure does not hold perfectly, consider the rela-
tionship
p1 = p2p3/[p2p3 + (1− p2p3) exp(−β)].(3)
Here β is a bias term for which β = 0 means that
the series structure with independent components
holds; also, for β < 0, p1 < p2p3 and for β > 0, p1 >
p2p3. Note that if a specific departure from the as-
sumed system structure is of interest, the departure
can be accommodated. For example, if there is a pos-
sible additional failure mode due to common causes,
the relationship given in Mosleh (1991) can be used.
For resource allocation, we see from (3) that to
reduce the uncertainty about the system reliability
p1, the uncertainty of the bias term β also needs to
be reduced. To do this requires some system tests.
Consider resource allocation when the assumed
system structure may not hold for the following prob-
lem:
• The existing data consist of 2 system tests (both
successes), 5 component 1 tests (5 successes) and
10 component 2 tests (9 successes).
• Prior distributions on the component reliabilities
and bias term β are taken to be diffuse. Combined
with the existing data listed above, the 90% credi-
ble intervals based on the resource allocation prior
distributions are (0.83, 1.00) for the component 1
reliability, (0.77, 0.98) for the component 2 relia-
bility and (−1.56, 2.75) for the bias term.
• The resulting resource allocation prior distribu-
tion for the system reliability has a 90% credi-
ble interval of (0.579, 0.992). Consequently, the
length of the initial 90% credible interval for sys-
tem reliability is 0.413.
For a budget B = 2500 and costs TC1 = 30 and
TC2 = TC3 = 1, the optimal allocation (based on
evaluating 2000 candidate allocations using a GA)
is to do as many system tests (i.e., 83) as possi-
ble. An allocation of (n1, n2, n3) = (83,10,0) yields
a value of 0.160 based on 1000 generated data sets
with 10,000 posterior draws per data analysis. For
this case, we see that in spite of the system test cost
being much larger than the component test costs,
the entire budget is essentially spent on system tests.
If initially there is less uncertainty about the bias
term, we expect there to be an allocation between
system and components tests; recall that the no bias
case presented above allocated the budget entirely
to component tests.
More study of resource allocation for more com-
plicated systems is needed. On the other hand, for
a specific situation one needs to employ an opti-
mization algorithm such as the GA we used in this
example to find an optimal allocation.
6. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we hope that we have conveyed the
importance of the role that statisticians can play
in assessing system reliability today and the many
research challenges that it presents. Somewhat face-
tiously, we thought of titling this paper “This ain’t
your father’s reliability!” or “System reliability
assessment—a statistician’s playground!,” because
both express the excitement that we have about the
research challenges in this field.
As Sections 2 and 3 showed, novel statistical mod-
els arise when statisticians want to leverage informa-
tion from all available data to bear in an assessment.
Even assessing a single component can be challeng-
ing when the data are from computer experiments
(Santner, Williams and Notz, 2003) in which veri-
fication, validation and calibration need to be ad-
dressed, and where multiscale physical experiments
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and historical system tests with multiple measure-
ment errors must be integrated. Moreover, as much
engineering and science knowledge as possible needs
to be incorporated into the statistical modeling.
Section 3 presented some of the challenges in in-
corporating multilevel data from various sources in
an assessment. Another example occurs when the
data come from different tests at different levels,
some of which are done at more severe conditions
than those experienced in normal use (Reese, Hamada
and Robinson, 2005). Section 3.5 also discussed elic-
itation of expert knowledge. This is critical in cap-
turing both the functional and physical structure of
a system, and more research is needed on techniques
and tools for carrying out this activity.
In Section 4, richer representations than fault trees
and reliability block diagrams were presented. More
research is needed on statistical inference with these
representations. Section 5 presented the emerging
problem of resource allocation. There are many in-
teresting problems beyond the binomial case. For
example, in an accelerated degradation data experi-
ment on a single component, one needs to determine
how much of the budget should be spent on this ex-
periment and subsequently, what levels of the accel-
erating variable should be studied, how many units
should be tested at each level and how often the
units should be inspected. There is much research
here that remains to be done.
Implementation of reliability assessment in large
systems is an issue and tools are needed, which is
a research effort in itself. Our organization (Statis-
tical Sciences Group at Los Alamos National Labo-
ratory) is developing qualitative system representa-
tion tools such as GROMIT (Klamann and Koehler,
2005) and statistical modeling tools such as YADAS
(Graves, 2003, 2007), as well as an interface between
them. However, many challenges remain. For exam-
ple, system reliability assessments are computation-
ally intensive. What approximations can be incor-
porated without sacrificing accuracy? Do we need
the power of a supercomputer? Resource allocation
is even more computationally intensive and brings
the issues of computation to the forefront.
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